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Gambling is pertinent to neuroscience research for at least two reasons. First, gambling is a naturalistic and pervasive example of risky
decision making, and thus gambling games can provide a paradigm for the investigation of human choice behavior and “irrationality.”
Second, excessive gambling involvement (i.e., pathological gambling) is currently conceptualized as a behavioral addiction, and research
on this conditionmay provide insights into addictive mechanisms in the absence of exogenous drug effects. This article is a summary of
topics covered in a Society forNeuroscienceminisymposium, focusing on recent advances in understanding the neural basis of gambling
behavior, including translational findings in rodents and nonhuman primates, which have begun to delineate neural circuitry and
neurochemistry involved.
Introduction
Gambling is a branch of the entertainment industry where pa-
trons stake an object of value (typically money) on the uncertain
prospect of a larger reward (the “jackpot”). Gambling dates back
severalmillennia and remains ubiquitous across human societies,
with lifetime gambling participation reported as 78% in the
United States (Kessler et al., 2008). As such, gambling games
serve as a useful model of risky choice, to the extent that labora-
tory tasksmodeling the choice between two lotteries are regarded
as “the fruitfly of behavioral economics” (Kahneman, 2011). In
light of the widespread recognition that the expected value of
gambling is negative (“the house always wins”), gambling games
may shed further light on some of the errors and biases that
characterize human decision making. Examining their underly-
ing neural mechanisms is naturally relevant to the emergent dis-
cipline of neuroeconomics.
Gambling also has a more insidious side. Pathological gam-
bling was first recognized as a psychiatric disorder in 1980 and
was grouped initially in the Impulse Control Disorders. An inter-
national program of research over the past decade has revealed
multiple similarities between pathological gambling and the sub-
stance use disorders, including neurobiological overlap (Petry,
2006, Leeman and Potenza, 2012). Whereas the comparability
with obsessive compulsive disorders was also evaluated, the sup-
port for placement on a “compulsive spectrum”wasmixed (Hol-
lander and Wong, 1995). This process culminated in the recent
reclassification of pathological gambling (now to be called “Gam-
bling Disorder”) into the addictions category of the DSM5 (Petry
et al., 2013). This ratification of the so-called “behavioral addic-
tions” is a pivotal step for not only the gambling field, but for
addictions research in general.
The current article aims to provide a concise overview of re-
cent developments in our understanding of decisionmaking dur-
ing gambling and the relevance of these processes to problem
gambling (for comprehensive overviews, see van Holst et al.,
2010; Hodgins et al., 2011; Leeman and Potenza, 2012).We begin
by describing some emerging methods for probing gambling de-
cisions, highlighting translational models, behavioral economic
tasks, and cognitive distortions associated with gambling (Fig. 1).
We then consider the underlying neural mechanisms, distin-
guishing neurochemical substrates and neuroanatomy.
Models of gambling decisions: translational probes
Given that the calculation of risk versus reward trade-offs is in-
herent in numerous aspects of real-world choice and foraging
behavior, it should be unsurprising that laboratory animals are
capable of performing decision-making tasks that resemble gam-
bling. Recent work has aimed tomodel gambling decisions in rats
using operant behavioral tasks derived from the established
probes of choice behavior in human neuropsychology and cog-
nitive psychology. One widely used human test is the Iowa Gam-
bling Task (Bechara et al., 1994), which quantifies the deficits in
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affective decision making seen after injury to the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex. In humans, this task involves a series of choices
between four decks of cards that offer gains and losses of varying
amounts of money. A key challenge in translating the procedure
into animals concerns the representation of “loss”; standard re-
inforcers, such as sugar pellets, are instantly consumed and thus
cannot be deducted in the sameway asmoney or points. In the rat
Gambling Task (Zeeb et al., 2009), rats choose between four ap-
ertures that vary in the probability of delivering a smaller or larger
number of sugar pellets, as well as the probability of receiving
time-out penalties of varying durations. Like the human version,
the two apertures that offer larger rewards are also associatedwith
longer andmore frequent time-outs, andmost rats learn to avoid
these tempting options tomaximize their sugar pellet profits over
the duration of the task. (The key decision here is probabilistic
and the task should not be confused with temporal discounting).
Postacquisition lesions to BLA skewed rats’ preference toward
the high-risk high-reward options,matching the observation that
amygdala damage leads to disadvantageous choice in the Iowa
Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1999; Zeeb and Winstanley,
2011). If BLA lesions were made before task acquisition, animals
struggled to develop the optimal strategy and correctly discrimi-
nate between the options. Lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) impaired acquisition of the rodent task in an identical
manner but did not affect performance if the lesions were imple-
mented after animals had learned the correct strategy. Such data
support the suggestion that the classic disruption of everyday
decision making associated with ventromedial prefrontal cortex
lesions may stem from a difficulty in learning the optimal strat-
egy, rather than an increase in preference for risky outcomes per
se (Bechara et al., 2000; Fellows and Farah, 2005). Moreover, the
similarity between the effects of BLA and OFC lesions on task
acquisition suggested that these two areas work together to pro-
mote development of the optimal strategy, a hypothesis recently
confirmedusing a functional disconnection procedure (Zeeb and
Winstanley, 2013). Hence, similar brain regions appear to be
involved in guiding decision making under uncertainty in both
rats and humans.
Prefrontal connectivity with the striatum is also implicated in
choice behavior. Contemporary hypotheses of frontostriatal
function emphasize a primary role in either action selection or
reinforcement learning, both of which are likely important in
substance addiction and behavioral addictions. To differentiate
these elements, Seo et al. (2012) trained monkeys on a task in
which they had to select rewarding actions using either reinforce-
ment learning or perceptual inference. While the animals per-
formed this task, neural activitywasmonitored simultaneously in
anatomically connected regions of lateral prefrontal cortex
(LPFC; caudal area 46) and the dorsal striatum (DS, primarily the
anterior caudate nucleus). A larger fraction of LPFC neurons
represented selected actions, independent of how they were se-
lected. In the perceptual inference condition, the LPFC represen-
tation of the selected action preceded theDS representation of the
selected action, whereas in the reinforcement learning condition,
both structures represented the actions up to 500 ms before they
were executed, with no clear temporal ordering. Additionally, DS
more often represented the value of the selected action when it
was selected using both perceptual inference and reinforcement
learning. Thus, a hypothesis that the DSwas important for action
selection was not supported, but DS did often represent action
values, when driven by either reinforcement learning or percep-
tual inference. LPFC, by contrast, appears to play a dominant role
in representing and selecting actions, particularly when the selec-
tion is based on perceptual inference.
Insights from behavioral economics
Behavioral economic aims to decompose the processes of option
valuation into simple components that can be quantified with
discrete parameters (Schonberg et al., 2011). Prospect theory
(PT) remains themost influential of these accounts because of its
ability to describe a range of common behaviors and deviations
from normative expected value theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). A central feature of PT is “loss aversion,” referring to the
empirical observation that humans (and other species) are more
sensitive to losses than to gains. For example, subjects typically
reject mixed gambles that offer a 50–50 chance of winning or
losing a given amount of money. Loss aversion may be under-
pinned by value computations in the ventral striatum and
amygdala (Tom et al., 2007; DeMartino et al., 2010) and has been
shown to be modulated by thalamic norepinephrine (Takahashi
et al., 2013). In addition to this asymmetry between gains and
losses, PT describes a value function for gains that is concave,
Figure 1. Schematic overview showing the emergingmethods for modeling gambling decisions and the associated neural circuitry. The list is not intended as comprehensive but highlights the
core themes covered in this review.
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contrasting with a value function for losses that is convex. This
disparity accounts for subjects’ tendency to be risk averse in the
gain domain and risk seeking in the loss domain, which may
account for the “loss chasing” behavior that is characteristic of
problem gamblers (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2008, 2011). Al-
though recent work has demonstrated impaired processing of
loss information (Brevers et al., 2012) and aversive signals (Brun-
borg et al., 2012) in pathological gamblers, loss aversion is yet to
be formally quantified in pathological gamblers.
PT also posits nonlinearity in probability calibration, whereby
small probabilities are overestimated and medium to high prob-
abilities are underestimated, in an inverse S-shaped “probability
weighting function.” These subjective distortions are reflected in
brain activity profiles observed in the ventral striatum and dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (Tobler et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2009)
and also correlate with striatal dopamine D1 receptor density
(Takahashi et al., 2010). Behaviorally, the overestimation of small
probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of gambles,
such as a lottery (Trepel et al., 2005). Ligneul et al. (2013) tested
this hypothesis in pathological gamblers, calculating “certainty
equivalents” across varying levels of objective probability from 0
to 1. As expected, the results revealed elevated risk taking in gam-
blers comparedwith nongambling controls; however, this behav-
ior was not linked to a specific distortion of small probabilities
but rather to a general overweighting across the entire probability
range. Similar approaches using the discounting framework have
demonstrated fine alterations of value representations in the ven-
tral striatum in pathological gamblers (Miedl et al., 2012; Peters
et al., 2012).
Gambling-related cognitive distortions
In addition to the computational characterization of gambling
offered by behavioral economics, psychological models of gam-
bling have additionally highlighted the central role of cognitive
distortions during gambling. These distortions refer to how the
gambler thinks about randomness, chance, and skill (Ladouceur
and Walker, 1996; Clark, 2010) and foster an inappropriately
high expectation of winning during the game. A number of specific
biases have been described, and these cognitions can be effectively
targeted as one element of psychotherapy for pathological gambling
(Fortune and Goodie, 2012).
Arguably, the most classic distortion is the gambler’s fallacy,
which is a bias in the processing of random sequences. In this
compelling example, the expectancy of a certain event (e.g., heads
in a coin flip) becomes less likely after a long series of the same
event (e.g., three successive tails). The phenomenon occurs
across many situations, including casino gambling (Sundali and
Croson, 2006), but also stock investment (Johnson et al., 2005). It
is widely viewed as arising from the representativeness heuristic,
the belief that a short segment of a random sequence should
reflect the overall distribution (Rabin, 2002; Ayton and Fischer,
2004). Another archetypal distortion is the “illusion of control,”
referring to the interpretation of skill involvement in situations
that are governed by chance alone (Langer, 1975; Stefan and Da-
vid, 2013). Illusory control can be fostered by a various psycho-
logical features of games, such as the involvement of a choice
(e.g., choosing a lottery ticket), instrumental action (e.g., throw-
ing a roulette ball), or apparent competition (Langer, 1975). A
recent study using a contingency judgment task from the associa-
tive learning literature found that pathological gamblers dis-
played a greater tendency to overestimate their control of positive
outcomes than nongambling participants (Orgaz et al., 2013).
Other recent work has considered the impact of “near miss” out-
comes, unsuccessful outcomes that are proximal to a major win
(Kassinove and Schare, 2001). Using a slot machine task that
delivered occasional jackpot wins, near misses (where the reels
landed adjacent to a win) were associated with higher self-
reportedmotivations to gamble than full-miss outcomes, despite
their objective equivalence as nonwins (Clark et al., 2009). To
date,most of the research on these distortions has been in healthy
samples; and although questionnairemeasures, such as the Gam-
bling Related Cognitions Scale (Raylu and Oei, 2004), indicate a
clear increase in the overall propensity toward these erroneous
beliefs in pathological gamblers (Michalczuk et al., 2011), there
remain few empirical demonstrations that pathological gamblers
are oversensitive to specific biases.
Neurochemical substrates: dopamine dysregulation
Dopamine has been a prime candidate for investigation of neu-
rochemical abnormalities in pathological gamblers, given its es-
tablished roles in both drug addiction and rewarded behavior. In
patients with Parkinson’s disease, sudden onset gambling can be
observed, alongside other reward-driven behaviors, including
compulsive shopping and hypersexuality, as a side effect of dopa-
mine agonist medications (Ambermoon et al., 2011; Voon et al.,
2011). The most direct approach for quantifying dopamine
transmission in human brain is PET imaging of dopamine li-
gands, of which the most widely studied is [11C]-raclopride, a
D2/3 receptor antagonist that binds predominantly in the stria-
tum. Building upon evidence for robust reductions in striatal
dopamineD2/3 receptor availability in substance users dependent
on a number of distinct drugs (Martinez et al., 2004; Volkow et
al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008), recent studies have used this ligand in
pathological gamblers (Linnet et al., 2011; Clark et al., 2012;
Joutsa et al., 2012; Boileau et al., 2013). Notably, none of these
studies has detected a significant group difference in dopamine
D2/3 binding, although some individual differences have been
observed, for example, against trait impulsivity (Clark et al.,
2012).
Ongoing work is using alternative PET tracers that offer ad-
vantages over [11C]-raclopride. [11C]-()-Propyl-hexahydro-
naphtho-oxazin (PHNO) is a D2/3 receptor agonist that binds
preferentially to D3 over D2 receptors in vivo (Narendran et al.,
2006). TheD3 receptor subtype is localized to limbic circuitry and
implicated in drug self-administration and relapse behavior in
preclinical models (Heidbreder et al., 2005). As a dopamine re-
ceptor agonist, [ 11C]-()-PHNO is also more sensitive to dis-
placement by endogenous dopamine than [11C]-raclopride (an
antagonist) (Willeit et al., 2008). A recent PET study using [11C]-
()-PHNO inmethamphetamine abusers indicated higher base-
line binding in the D3-rich substantia nigra and pallidum,
coupled with lower binding in the D2-rich dorsal striatum (Boileau
et al., 2012). Employing amultimodal PET design in pathological
gamblers using both [11C]-()-PHNO and [11C]-raclopride
(Boileau et al., 2013), no group differences were detected, but a
positive correlation was observed between gambling severity
scores and [11C]-()-PHNO binding in substantia nigra, a re-
gion where signal is fully attributable to D3 (Tziortzi et al., 2011).
This association suggests that D3 expression is relevant to symp-
tom severity in problem gambling, and as an addiction pheno-
type, it may be a useful marker for risk.
Preliminaryworkhas alsobegun to examinedopamine release in
pathological gamblers, with some provocative early findings. The
change in [11C]-()-PHNObindingwas examinedafter a challenge
dose of oral amphetamine (0.4 mg/kg) in pathological gamblers:
greater dopamine release was detected in the dorsal (associative)
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striatum in the pathological gamblers (D. Payer, I. Boileau,D. Lobo,
B. Chugani, A. Behzadi, A. Wilson, S. J. Kish, S. Houle, M. Zack,
unpublishedobservations).This result effect is echoed in two further
experiments examining task-related changes in [11C]-raclopride
binding in pathological gamblers, where higher levels of dopamine
release were correlated with greater subjective excitement (Linnet et
al., 2011) and gambling severity (Joutsa et al., 2012). Notably, the
available data in drug addiction show blunted dopamine release in
response to psychostimulant administration (Volkow et al., 1997;
Martinez et al., 2007).The extent towhich thesediscrepancies reflect
etiological differences between substance andbehavioral addictions,
or themasking of incentive sensitization processes via drug-induced
depletion of dopamine stores (Robinson and Berridge, 2003), is a
key question in ongoing research.
Rodent models have also provided a means of examining the
neurochemistry of gambling, implicating dopamine and sero-
tonin influences. In light of the effects of dopamine agonist med-
ications in Parkinson’s disease, it is notable that administration of
selective D2 agonists did not affect choice behavior on the rat
Gambling Task (Zeeb et al., 2009). However, whereas the D2
receptor antagonist eticlopride improved choice of the best option,
amphetamine and the 5-HT1A agonist 8-OH-DPAT were found to
impair performance (Zeeb et al., 2009). Selective dopamine antago-
nists did not block the effects of amphetamine on choice, even
though such agents did attenuate amphetamine-induced increases
in motor impulsivity (Zeeb et al., 2013). Furthermore, amphet-
amine’s effects were not mimicked by dopamine, 5-HT, or nor-
adrenaline reuptake inhibitors but were reproduced by different
combinations of these drugs (Baarendse et al., 2013). Such results
imply concurrent regulationof choice behavior on the ratGambling
Task by multiple monoaminergic systems, consistent with human
data (Rogers, 2011).
A modified choice procedure in the rodent has been used to
assess the sensitivity to stake size, implicating striatal D2/3 trans-
mission specifically (Cocker et al., 2012). In this task, the rats
choose between two options of equivalent value, one of which
delivers a guaranteed reward, and the other offers either double
that reward or nothing, with 50:50 odds. The reward size varies
over the session from 1 to 3 pellets. Whereas some animals are
largely indifferent to this “escalation of commitment,” other rats
become markedly risk avoidant as the stake increases, increas-
ing their preference for the guaranteed option (Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2012; Sescousse and den Ouden, 2013).
Critically, such a behavioral shift confers no advantage in terms of
reward earned and may be considered irrational in a similar vein
to the framing effects observed in human choice under risk. PET
imaging using 11C-raclopride revealed that D2/3 receptor binding
in the dorsal striatum correlated significantly with the degree of
wager-sensitivity rats exhibited. Moreover, in a key advantage
over human PET imaging, it was possible to use autoradiography
to confirm that the differences in raclopride binding were the
result of lower levels of D2/3 receptor expression, as opposed to
variation in endogenous dopamine levels.
Functional neuroimaging of reward-related circuitry
Functional neuroimaging studies have also contributed much to
our understanding of appetitive processing in pathological gam-
blers and provide data that complement the investigations of
dopamine transmission (Schott et al., 2008). Several fMRI studies
in pathological gamblers have reported blunted neural responses
to monetary gains and appetitive cues, primarily in ventral stria-
tum and orbital/lateral PFC (Reuter et al., 2005; de Ruiter et al.,
2009; Balodis et al., 2012). This observation can be interpreted in
terms of the reward deficiency hypothesis (Comings and Blum,
2000), consistent with the PET evidence reviewed above indicat-
ing reduced dopamine receptor levels in addiction. However,
other recent studies have described increased, rather than de-
creased, responses to monetary rewards in the same population
(Hewig et al., 2010 using EEG; vanHolst et al., 2012 using fMRI),
prompting ongoing debate about the impact of naturalistic cues
and stage of processing (anticipation vs outcome) in these effects
(Leyton and Vezina, 2013; Limbrick-Oldfield et al., 2013).
One means of resolving these discrepancies is to consider the
sensitivity to nonmonetary (i.e., nonaddiction related) rewards
in gamblers. Using an incentive delay protocol involving both
monetary and visual erotic rewards, pathological gamblers
showed a markedly decreased response to the erotic cues, com-
pared with monetary cues, in the ventral striatum (Sescousse et
al., 2013). This differential response was correlated with the se-
verity of gambling symptoms and accompanied by a similarly
reduced behavioral motivation for erotic rewards. Comparable
designs indicate blunted brain responses to non–drug-related
cues in drug-addicted groups (Goldstein et al., 2007;Wrase et al.,
2007; Bu¨hler et al., 2010). These findings suggest that the key
variable of interest may be the differential response to monetary
(or drug) rewards versus other (primary) appetitive cues, rather
than the response to money or drugs per se.
Experiments on gambling-related cognitive distortions also
implicate reward-related circuitry, as well as the interactions with
regions responsible for top-down cognitive control. Specifically,
the gambler’s fallacy appears to arise from an imbalance between
cognitive and emotional decision making mechanisms in the
brain (Shiv et al., 2005; Xue et al., 2011). Using a card guessing
task to capture subjects’ tendency to predict the break of a streak
as it continued (a signal of the gambler’s fallacy), enhancedneural
responses in left LPFC were observed to outcomes that were fol-
lowed by a gambler’s fallacy switch (Xue et al., 2012b). A
follow-up experiment applied anodal transcranial direct current
stimulation, a procedure known to enhance cortical excitability
and cerebral perfusion (Stagg et al., 2013), over the same region.
Corroborating the fMRI data, stimulation to left LPFC increased
the use of the gambler’s fallacy (Xue et al., 2012b) and point to a
causal role of this region in implementing this suboptimal deci-
sion strategy, guided by false world models.
Extending this interpretation in a larger sample of college stu-
dents (N  438), the use of the gambler’s fallacy was positively
correlated with general intelligence (Raven’s matrices) and exec-
utive function (2-back working memory and Stroop tasks) but
was negatively correlated with affective decision making (Iowa
Gambling Task) (Xue et al., 2012a). Thus, the gambler’s fallacy
seems to be associated with (1) weak function in the affective
decision making system and (2) strong function in the LPFC
cognitive control system (Xue et al., 2011, 2012b).
In contrast to these cortical responses, the robust striatal acti-
vations seen in response tomonetarywins are not evidentlymod-
ulated by the psychological context that characterizes these
gambling distortions. For example, the striatal responses to win-
ning outcomes did not differ between the first win in a streak,
compared with the fourth successive win (Akitsuki et al., 2003).
In a study investigating the illusion of control, striatal activity did
not differ between choice and no-choice conditions, even though
perceived control did enhance subjective confidence (Kool et al.,
2013). However, both distortions appear to be coded in higher
cortical regions. Using a card guessing game to compare trials
where either the subject or computer predicted the location of the
winning card, agency affected not only the amount bet but also
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subjects’ “world model” regarding the outcome dependency
(Xue et al., 2013). Functional imaging results revealed that the
decision-related activation in the lateral and medial PFC was sig-
nificantly modulated by both agency and previous outcome and
that these effects were further predicted by the trait-like disposi-
tion to attribute negative events externally. These results suggest
that the prefrontal decision making system can be modulated by
abstract beliefs and are thus vulnerable to factors, such as false
agency and attribution.
Nevertheless, subcortical responses have been observed to
near-miss outcomes during a simulated slot machine task. Spe-
cifically, these events recruited overlapping neural circuitry to the
jackpot wins in the ventral striatum, amygdale, and anterior in-
sula (Clark et al., 2009; Shao et al., 2013). Of these responses, the
effect in the insula was seen to covary with trait levels of gambling
distortions and individual differences in the motivational effect
of the nearmisses (Clark et al., 2009). Administering a behavioral
version of the slot machine game to patients with focal brain
injury, a group with insula lesions was seen to be insensitive to
near misses (i.e., did not show the typical motivational response)
and also failed tomanifest the gambler’s fallacy (L. Clark, B. Studer,
J. Bruss, D. Tranel, A. Bechara, unpublished observations). Thus,
these results againhighlight howgambling cognitions andpersistent
play are most likely to emerge from an imbalance between
bottom-up emotional systems and prefrontal control systems,
rather than a disruption in either component in isolation.
In conclusion, studies of cognitive processing during gam-
bling have begun to uncover a wealth of phenomena that are
relevant to problematic gambling, and useful as more general
models of human decision making. The arsenal of tasks that
probe gambling-related decision making can be implemented in
other mental health problems associated with decision making
disruption, including schizophrenia (Balzan et al., 2013), obses-
sive compulsive disorder (Reuven-Magril et al., 2008), and sui-
cidal behavior (Dombrovski et al., 2011). The convergence with
translational models of choice behavior in nonhuman species
carries enormous potential for delineating the neural circuitry.
Thus far, the translational work has progressed primarily in the
area of value-based decision making, highlighting the roles of
prefrontal cortex, striatum, and amygdala, innervating by as-
cending dopamine and serotonin inputs. Further progress may
be achieved by modeling constructs from behavioral economics,
and gambling-related cognitive distortions, in nonhuman spe-
cies. For example, recent data from a rodent slot machine task
indicate that rats are susceptible to near-miss outcomes and that
erroneous attempts to collect reward on near-miss trials were
dramatically increased by the D2-receptor agonist quinpirole
(Winstanley et al., 2011). Interestingly, these effects appear to be
mediated by the D4 receptor subtype specifically, leading to the
exciting possibility that D4 receptor antagonists may be a useful
treatment for compulsive slotmachine play (P.Cocker, B. Le Foll,
R. Rogers, C. A. Winstanley, unpublished observations).
Studies of patients with pathological gambling are also begin-
ning to provide clues about the mechanisms involved in addic-
tion. One interpretation of the null results from investigations of
[11C]-raclopride binding in pathological gamblers is that the ro-
bust reductions observed in drug addiction may represent a con-
sequence of long-term drug exposure, rather than a preexisting
vulnerability marker (Groman et al., 2012). Over the coming
decade, we anticipate a similar program of research for other
candidate behavioral addictions, such as excessive online video
gaming (Kim et al., 2011; Ku¨hn et al., 2011).
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